Specialised facility at DG EME headquarters examines drone hardware, firmware and software for backdoors, hidden credentials, remote-access tools and electronic-warfare vulnerabilities

New Delhi, September 12: The Indian Army has established a specialised laboratory in Delhi to examine military drones for hidden electronic, software and cyber vulnerabilities, with particular attention to unauthorised foreign-origin components, including those from China.

The facility, known as AASHVAST — Assessment and Analysis of Electronic Systems Hardware for Vulnerabilities and Security Threats — has been established at the Directorate General of Electronics and Mechanical Engineering (DG EME) headquarters in Delhi Cantonment.

The laboratory was inaugurated by Chief of Army Staff General Dhiraj Seth on August 14, 2026, alongside a Wireless & Security Anti-Drone Laboratory, according to IIT Roorkee’s iHUB DivyaSampark.

The initiative comes as unmanned aerial systems become increasingly important for surveillance, reconnaissance, logistics, electronic warfare and combat operations. The Army is now seeking to ensure that a drone’s security is assessed not merely from its physical performance, but also from what is embedded inside its electronics and software.

Beyond Conventional Drone Testing

Traditional testing can establish whether a drone flies correctly, meets endurance requirements and performs its assigned mission.

AASHVAST takes the examination deeper.

Reports on the facility say it can analyse hardware, firmware and software, allowing specialists to examine the electronic architecture and digital instructions that control an unmanned system. The facility is designed to work in an air-gapped, offline and read-only environment, reducing the possibility of external interference while software is being examined.

This approach is particularly important because a drone could appear completely legitimate during physical inspection while potentially containing vulnerabilities within its flight controller, navigation system, communications equipment or firmware.

Searching for Hidden Digital Backdoors

One of AASHVAST’s key functions is to look for indicators that could compromise a drone’s security.

According to reports, its examination can include searches for:

  • Hidden passwords and credentials
  • Embedded encryption keys
  • Unauthorised software or hardware
  • Secret command pathways
  • Remote-access tools
  • Malicious or modified firmware
  • Unauthorised software-update mechanisms
  • Altered flight restrictions or operational parameters

The objective is to establish whether a drone is genuine, whether its software has been modified and whether its digital systems contain features that could potentially be exploited by an unauthorised party.

Why Chinese-Origin Components Are a Focus

A major concern behind the initiative is the presence of Chinese-origin components in military drones and other defence electronics.

The issue is not simply where a complete drone is manufactured. Modern unmanned systems can contain dozens of subsystems sourced through complex global supply chains, including flight controllers, navigation equipment, sensors, communications modules and other electronic components.

That creates what defence planners describe as a supply-chain security challenge.

A drone assembled in India, for example, could theoretically contain a foreign-origin component that introduces a vulnerability even though the overall platform is domestically manufactured.

The Army’s new laboratory provides a mechanism to examine such systems at a much deeper technical level. Recent reporting says the facility has specifically been tasked with identifying Chinese-origin components and potential security risks associated with them.

GPS Spoofing and Jamming Under the Scanner

The laboratory’s role also extends into the increasingly important field of electronic warfare.

Modern military drones rely heavily on satellite navigation and communications links. An adversary capable of disrupting or manipulating those signals could potentially affect a drone’s navigation and mission.

AASHVAST is reported to assess how drones respond to GPS spoofing and jamming and examine the security controls governing their behaviour under such conditions.

GPS jamming attempts to overwhelm navigation signals, while spoofing involves transmitting deceptive signals that can cause a navigation system to calculate a false position.

For military UAVs operating near contested borders or in environments where electronic warfare is expected, resilience against both threats can be critical.

The Cybersecurity of the Battlefield

The significance of AASHVAST goes beyond drones.

Military operations are becoming increasingly dependent on interconnected sensors, communications networks, autonomous systems and digital command-and-control architecture. As a result, the distinction between physical security and cybersecurity is becoming increasingly blurred.

The Army’s decision to inspect unmanned platforms at the firmware and electronic-component level reflects this changing battlefield environment.

The facility effectively adds another security layer before a system is cleared for sensitive military use: verify not only what the drone can do, but also what its internal electronics and software are capable of doing.

Part of India’s Wider Push for Indigenous Defence Technology

The AASHVAST initiative also fits into India’s broader Aatmanirbhar Bharat drive in defence.

The Indian Army has been expanding indigenous drone manufacturing and technology development. The Ministry of Defence’s 2025 year-end review said Army Base Workshops and selected Corps Z Workshops and EME units had developed drone-manufacturing capabilities, with 819 drones manufactured by EME units at that stage.

However, indigenous assembly does not automatically mean complete technological independence.

Critical electronic components can still originate outside India, making supply-chain verification increasingly important.

AASHVAST therefore represents a move towards deeper technological sovereignty, where India seeks greater visibility and control over the individual electronic and software elements that make up military platforms.

A New Layer of Drone Security

The emergence of AASHVAST comes at a time when drones have transformed military operations worldwide.

Small UAVs can now perform surveillance, target acquisition, logistics, precision strikes and other missions at relatively low cost. At the same time, their dependence on software, navigation and communications makes them potential targets for cyber and electronic attacks.

The Army’s new testing architecture is aimed at addressing that vulnerability before it becomes an operational problem.

Rather than waiting for a compromised system to reveal itself on the battlefield, the objective is to identify weaknesses inside the platform during technical assessment.

Key Takeaways

  • AASHVAST stands for Assessment and Analysis of Electronic Systems Hardware for Vulnerabilities and Security Threats.
  • The facility is located at DG EME headquarters, Delhi Cantonment.
  • It was inaugurated by COAS General Dhiraj Seth on August 14, 2026.
  • It examines hardware, software and firmware in military drones.
  • It searches for hidden credentials, encryption keys, remote-access tools and secret command pathways.
  • The facility has a particular focus on detecting Chinese-origin components.
  • It assesses resilience against GPS spoofing and jamming.
  • The lab operates in an air-gapped, offline environment for secure analysis.
  • The initiative supports India’s wider push for secure and indigenous defence technology.

**AASHVAST marks a significant shift in military equipment testing: from simply asking whether a drone works, to determining whether every critical electronic and digital element inside it can be trusted.**